In Lundgren & Johnson’s first article from the criminal vehicular operation series in October 2017, we discussed the eight categories of Minnesota criminal vehicular homicide (CVH) and criminal vehicular operation (CVO) charges. While those eight categories encompass a variety of factual circumstances, each one has a common requirement: causation. In other words, Minnesota criminal vehicular homicide and operation charges all require that the prosecutor allege a particular defendant caused the death or injury of another. Further, in order to convict a defendant of CVH or CVO, a prosecutor must then prove that accusation beyond a reasonable doubt.
For the purposes of this article, we will use the term criminal vehicular homicide as an umbrella term for the offenses constituting CVO and CVH. The varying distinctions of the severity of charges involving CVH and CVO will be addressed in another part of this continuing series in the Lundgren & Johnson blog.
The Origins of Minnesota Criminal Vehicular Homicide Laws
Criminal vehicular homicide and criminal vehicular operation are both derived from involuntary manslaughter. The Minnesota Legislature codified the offenses separately in 1983. Like involuntary manslaughter, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant’s conduct was the “proximate cause” of death or injury in order to convict someone of criminal vehicular homicide. Additionally, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of an intervening, superseding cause of harm that would limit a defendant’s liability for her culpable conduct, if any. Thus, not only must a defendant’s act have been a “proximate cause” of the death or injury, there must not have been the intervention of an efficient independent force in which the accused did not participate or which she could not reasonably have foreseen.
Minnesota Courts’ Development of Causation Definition in Criminal Vehicular Homicide Cases
State v. Jaworsky, 505 N.W.2d 638 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) was the first Minnesota case to use the civil definition of proximate cause in a criminal vehicular operation case, defining proximate cause as “something that played a substantial part in bringing about the death or injury.” Since Jaworsky, many other Minnesota appellate opinions have furthered this civil “substantial factor” definition of causation – and it is now commonly used in criminal vehicular homicide and operation cases. As examples:
- State v. Dunagan, 521 N.W.2d 355 (Minn.1994) – relied on the substantial factor test to define proximate cause in criminal vehicular operation case;
- State v. Hofer, 614 N.W.2d 734 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) – decided that in a criminal vehicular homicide case causation is established by proof that the accused’s conduct was a substantial causal factor in bringing about the harm; and
- In re Welfare of C.P.W., 601 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) – relied on substantial factor test to define proximate cause in criminal vehicular homicide case.
These principles of causation in the criminal law apply with equal force in cases charging a defendant with manslaughter. See State v. Smith, 119 N.W.2d 838 (Minn.1962) and State v. Olson, 459 N.W.2d 711 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
A “proximate cause” is distinguishable from those causes that are merely a “cause in fact” or “but for cause” of injury, which do not have legal significance. Kryzer v. Champlin Am. Legion No. 600, 494 N.W.2d 35 (Minn. 1992). The Minnesota Supreme has rejected the “but-for” causation test because “it converts events both near and far, which merely set the stage for an accident, into a convoluted series of ‘causes’ of the accident.” Harpster v. Hetherington, 512 N.W.2d 585 (Minn. 1994). In other words, if every factor that brought about a crash were deemed a “proximate cause” for that accident, liability would extend too far and vast for the result to be considered logical, just, or equitable. The proximate cause test is designed to weed out those but-for causes to identify the root, or roots, of the blameworthy conduct.
In a nutshell, for a party’s negligence to be the proximate cause of an injury, Minnesota law requires that the act must be one which the party ought, in the exercise of ordinary care, to have anticipated was likely to result in injury or death to others. There must also be a showing that the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury or death.
Examples of Minnesota Courts’ Application of the Proximate Cause Test
Because there can be more than one cause of a resulting harm, the negligence of a second party may affect the determination of proximate cause as to a first party’s negligence. Below are short descriptions of cases where Minnesota courts had to weigh the negligent acts of two parties to determine what the proximate cause, or causes, were of an accident.
- It has long been the law in Minnesota that speeding, alone, is not necessarily a proximate cause of a resulting accident. In Draxton v. Katzmarek, 280 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1938), the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, “Where it appears that an automobile involved in an accident was being driven at a speed which is prima facie unlawful or negligent, speed alone is not necessarily a proximate cause of a resulting accident.”
- In Provinsal v. Peterson, 169 N.W.481 (Minn. 1917), a pedestrian was struck and injured by an automobile as he stepped off a sidewalk into a crosswalk in an attempt to cross the street. The plaintiff “walked directly into or a[g]ainst the automobile, and was thrown to the ground and injured.” According to the Minnesota Supreme Court, “[h]e was struck by the rear wheel and rear fender; a step forward as he came up to the moving automobile brought his foot directly in the path of the rear wheel, and the toe of his shoe was run over.” The facts were undisputed that there “were no obstructions to a clear view up and down the street plaintiff was intending to cross, and he testified that he looked in both directions, but did not see the approaching automobile, though it must have been in plain view at the time and not far away.” In short, Mr. Provinsal “walked directly into the moving automobile.” The Minnesota Supreme Court decided, “It seems clear that the speed of the automobile had nothing to do with the accident. Plaintiff did not see it approaching, and the speed thereof in no way could have deceived or misled him. He walked into the car and got hurt; and that is all there is to the situation.”
- In DeHaan v. Wolff, 227 N.W. 350 (Minn.1927) and Sorenson v. Sanderson, 223 N.W. 145 (Minn.1929), the Minnesota Supreme Court held that even when a driver of a motor vehicle is speeding through an intersection and is involved in a collision, he may not be the proximate cause of the accident if the other motorist failed to look or see the speeding motorist’s vehicle.
- In Wilmes v. Mihelich, 25 N.W.2d 833 (Minn.1947) a plaintiff motorcycle driver brought a claim for damages against the driver of an automobile after his motorcycle struck the automobile at an intersection in the city of Saint Cloud. The plaintiff argued that defendant’s excessive speed was the proximate cause of the accident, and that the defendant further forfeited his statutory right of way by exceeding the speed limit. The supreme court rejected both of these contentions, and reiterated its prior holding from DeHann that a driver who fails to look and see another vehicle, even a speeding vehicle, that would be observed had the driver looked and seen such vehicle, is not relieved of their duty of care. Indeed, in DeHann, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated that there was “no occasion” to determine the meaning or effect of the law forfeiting a driver’s right of way when said driver is speeding in the instance a second driver fails to look and see an oncoming vehicle.
Breaking the Chain of Causation in a Criminal Vehicular Homicide Case
Even in a criminal vehicular homicide case where a defendant’s action can be proven to be a proximate cause of the death of another, that causation chain can be broken by establishing an intervening and superseding cause of the accident. An intervening, superseding act breaks the chain of causation set in operation by a defendant’s negligence, thereby insulating his negligence as a direct cause of the injury. Minnesota courts have explained that a superseding, intervening cause of harm is generally the act of a third party occurring after a defendant’s negligent act and operating as an independent force to produce the injury.
An intervening, superseding cause of harm will act as a limitation on a defendant’s liability for his otherwise culpable conduct. For an intervening cause to be considered a superseding cause, the intervening cause must satisfy four elements:
- Its harmful effects must have occurred after the original negligence;
- It must not have been brought about by the original negligence;
- It must have actively worked to bring about a result which would not otherwise have followed from the original negligence; and
- It must not have been reasonably foreseeable by the original wrongdoer.
If present, a superseding cause “breaks the chain” of causation that a defendant begins with his conduct. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance for all of the surrounding circumstances of a motor vehicle accident to be investigated when criminal vehicular homicide charges result. Criminal vehicular homicide charges are rarely straight forward and often depend on a careful analysis of all of the events leading up to the accident, such as:
- In the event the accident was a multiple vehicle accident, then the driving conduct of all of the drivers involved;
- The operability and condition of all of the cars involved;
- The driving histories and license status of all the drivers involved;
- The road conditions at the time of the accident;
- The proper or improper usage of vehicle equipment such as turn signals or headlights;
- The physical conditions of the driver’s involved – whether they were distracted by a cell phone, food, makeup, etc., whether they were tired or alert, or if they were under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance;
- What evasive measures, if any, were taken by each of the drivers;
- Similarly, in the event of a vehicle-pedestrian accident, it is important to determine the pedestrian’s conduct leading up to the accident. For example, whether the pedestrian darted out in front of oncoming traffic from a position of relative safety;
- The location of the pedestrian in relation to the roadway, any sidewalks, or crosswalks;
- The time of day and lighting involved at the time of the accident;
- What type of clothing the pedestrian was wearing and whether it was bright or dark colored, reflective or not; and
- The physical condition of the pedestrian and whether they were distracted by a cell phone, book, etc., whether they were tired or alert, and whether they were under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.
What an Experienced Criminal Vehicular Homicide Lawyer can do for You
Having knowledge about the law and potential defenses premised on causation is one thing, but preparing a persuasive defense is another thing entirely. It takes an experienced lawyer to identify the potential avenues to explore and create a strategy to challenge causation in a criminal vehicular homicide case. An experienced lawyer will not simply rely on the evidence given to him by the prosecutor. After all, that evidence will support their case, but likely not yours. Finding a lawyer experienced in criminal vehicular operation cases is essential so that the judge and jury see the complete picture from your perspective, and not just the prosecutor’s perspective.
He or she will look at different areas of evidence that may prove beneficial to the defense and demand that the prosecutor provide those additional materials, when warranted. A criminal vehicular homicide lawyer will also know when it is beneficial to employ the services of a private investigator to further develop evidence in otherwise lacking areas. Lastly, the lawyer will have a variety of experts that he can recommend to the client in the areas of accident reconstruction, cell phone forensics, toxicology, etc.
The lawyers at Lundgren & Johnson, PSC, are experienced in criminal vehicular homicide and operation cases. If you have been charged with either, we are available to speak with you about your case during a no cost initial case consultation. You can reach David R. Lundgren or Adam T. Johnson from Lundgren & Johnson 24 hours a day at 612-767-9643 or by entering your information on this website. We look forward to speaking with you.