Minnesota Criminal Defense Lawyer David Lundgren Explains New Venue Precedent
By David Lundgren, Lundgren & Johnson, PSC
Two recent Minnesota appellate decisions should change the way every criminal defense lawyer thinks about venue. In State v. Paulson, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that the statutory venue requirement in Minn. Stat. § 627.01, requiring a criminal case to be tried in the county where the offense was committed, is not an element of the offense. Then, in State v. Anderson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals made clear that Paulson is not confined to guilty pleas. It applies in cases that go to trial as well. Read together, these opinions do not make venue irrelevant. They make venue strategy more important, because a criminal defense lawyer can no longer assume that a venue problem will later be treated like a missing element of the crime.
Paulson: The Minnesota Supreme Court Clarifies Minnesota Law
Paulson came to the Minnesota Supreme Court in the guilty-plea context. The defendant entered an Alford plea to kidnapping to facilitate a felony and then argued on appeal that his plea was inaccurate because the factual basis did not establish venue in Anoka County under section 627.01. The Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that the statutory venue requirement is not an element of the offense. Because venue does not go to a defendant’s substantive criminal culpability, the Court concluded that a plea can still satisfy the accuracy requirement even when the factual basis does not establish venue.
That holding matters because Paulson answered an open question in Minnesota law. The Supreme Court expressly stated that it had never previously answered whether the statutory right under section 627.01 to insist that a criminal trial be held in the county where the crime was committed is an element of the offense. The Court explained that earlier Minnesota cases had not resolved that issue and that the question had remained open until Paulson. In clarifying the law, the Court drew a line between the substantive elements that define guilt and the separate statutory rules governing where a case may be tried.
Paulson also made clear that venue still matters. The Court specifically noted that its holding did not make the statutory venue requirement meaningless, because a defendant may still assert the statutory venue right by pretrial motion. That point is critical for any criminal defense lawyer. Paulson changed the timing and framing of the fight over venue, not the importance of the issue. After Paulson, a criminal defense lawyer should treat venue as a distinct statutory issue to be litigated directly, rather than assuming it can always be repackaged later as a missing element of the offense.
Anderson: The Court of Appeals Extends Paulson Beyond Guilty Pleas
Anderson shows how far Paulson reaches. Anderson was not a plea case. It involved convictions after a court trial on stipulated evidence for financial exploitation of a vulnerable adult in Chisago County. On count three, the record was silent about where the offense occurred and whether any victim resided in Chisago County. The Court of Appeals had originally reversed that count after concluding the state failed to prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt. But the Minnesota Supreme Court granted further review, stayed the case pending Paulson, and then remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Paulson.
On remand, the Court of Appeals held that Paulson’s reasoning was not limited to guilty pleas. The Anderson court emphasized that, although Paulson arose in the plea context, the Minnesota Supreme Court framed the underlying question broadly: whether the statutory right under section 627.01 to insist that a criminal trial be held in the proper county is an element of the offense. Because Paulson answered that broader question “no,” the Court of Appeals concluded the same rule applies after trial. That is the important extension in Anderson. The court took Paulson’s rationale from plea accuracy and applied it to a post-trial sufficiency argument.
The practical result was significant. The Court of Appeals rejected Anderson’s ex post facto and fairness arguments, reasoning that Paulson clarified Minnesota law rather than changed the substantive elements of any offense. Because venue is not an element, the court held the state did not need to prove, in order to sustain count three, that any of the five offenses covered by that count occurred in Chisago County or that any of the three victims resided there. For any criminal defense lawyer, Anderson confirms that venue challenges can no longer be treated as ordinary element-based insufficiency claims after a verdict.
How Criminal Defense Lawyers Will View Venue Issues Moving Forward
After Paulson and Anderson, a criminal defense lawyer should view venue as an issue that must be identified early, researched carefully, and litigated directly. The first question will no longer be, “Can the state prove venue as though it were an element?” The better question will be, “What is the state’s venue theory, and have we challenged it at the right time and in the right way?” Paulson makes clear that venue is separate from substantive criminal culpability, while Anderson makes clear that this is true even when a case goes to trial.
These cases also remind criminal defense lawyers that venue analysis can be charge-specific and statute-specific. In Paulson, the litigation involved both the general venue statute and a separate statute the state argued applied because the child victim was found in Anoka County. In Anderson, the charged offense had its own prosecution provision allowing the case to be brought in the county where any part of the offense occurred or where a victim resided. A criminal defense lawyer should therefore evaluate every count separately, determine whether a special venue statute is in play, and test whether the prosecution’s theory actually matches the facts alleged.
The Minnesota Constitution’s Vicinage Clause May Still Matter
Paulson is also important for what it did not decide. Near the end of the opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressly noted that the Vicinage Clause in Article I, Section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution was not implicated there. The Court explained that the Vicinage Clause concerns the geographic area from which a jury may be drawn, and that the clause is not violated until a jury from a county other than the one in which the alleged offense occurred is actually impaneled to decide the case. Paulson therefore draws an important distinction between a statutory venue problem and a constitutional vicinage problem. A criminal defense lawyer should keep both concepts in mind, because they are related but not identical.
That distinction matters going forward. Paulson involved a guilty plea before any jury was impaneled, and Anderson involved a court trial after the defendant waived his jury-trial rights. So neither case resolved how Article I, Section 6 will operate in a future jury case where the panel is drawn from a different county or district. But Paulson strongly suggests that, even after venue has been reframed as a non-element statutory issue, a separate constitutional argument may still exist if the jury itself is drawn from outside the proper geographic area. For a criminal defense lawyer, that means a future case could present two distinct issues: whether the prosecution selected the proper county under Minnesota’s venue statutes, and whether the jury was drawn in a way that implicates the Minnesota Constitution’s vicinage protection.
Why Venue Issues Like Anderson Must Be Raised and Preserved
Even after Anderson, it remains essential to raise and preserve venue issues. In fact, Anderson is the best example of why preservation matters. The Court of Appeals initially reversed count three, the Minnesota Supreme Court intervened after Paulson, and the case returned with a different result. That procedural history shows how quickly venue law can shift when appellate courts refine the governing rule. A criminal defense lawyer who preserves the issue gives the client the best chance to benefit if the law changes again.
Paulson reinforces the same lesson from another angle. There, the defendant challenged venue on the original charges, but the Supreme Court specifically noted that he did not make a similar pretrial motion after the kidnapping charge was added. That detail should stand out to every criminal defense lawyer. When charges are amended, venue objections should be revisited, renewed, and clearly tied to the counts actually moving forward. Preservation should include a pretrial motion, a developed factual record, a clear ruling from the district court, and continued objection where necessary so the issue is available on appeal. And in a jury case, preservation should also include any separate vicinage objection if the jury is drawn from a different county or district.
That is especially important because Anderson may not be the final word. If the Anderson decision or a similar venue decision is later reviewed by the Minnesota Supreme Court, lawyers who have properly preserved venue rulings and related constitutional objections will be in the strongest position to argue for further clarification or a narrower reading of Paulson’s reach. For a criminal defense lawyer handling a close venue case, preserving the issue is not just good practice, it may be the difference between having an appellate argument or losing it.
Conclusion
The takeaway is straightforward. Paulson clarified that Minnesota’s statutory venue requirement is not an element of the offense, and Anderson extended that rule to cases decided after trial. For any criminal defense lawyer, that means venue remains important, but the strategy has changed. When warranted, venue should be challenged early, litigated explicitly, and preserved carefully at every stage. When a jury is drawn from a different county or district, a criminal defense lawyer should also consider whether the Minnesota Constitution’s Vicinage Clause presents a distinct issue that must be preserved. A Minnesota criminal defense lawyer must approach this new venue precedent deliberately and methodically. At Lundgren & Johnson, PSC, Criminal Defense Attorneys, we make strategic decisions about all aspects of the cases that we decide to take on, including issues like venue.
About the Author
David R. Lundgren is an AV Preeminent criminal defense attorney serving clients across the Twin Cities and Greater Minnesota. He has been admitted to practice since 2012, is a partner and co-founder of Lundgren & Johnson, PSC, Criminal Defense Attorneys, and focuses on criminal defense, DWI/DUI, criminal appeals, and Title IX defense. He has been selected as a Super Lawyers Rising Star from 2019 through 2025, a Super Lawyer in 2026, and is admitted in the U.S. Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit, the U.S. District Court for Minnesota, the Minnesota Supreme Court, and all Minnesota District Courts.
